Users of social, economic, or medical networks share personal information in exchange for tangible benefits, but may be harmed by leakage and misuse of the shared information. I analyze the effect of enhancing privacy in the presence of two opposing forces: network effects and informational...

We study a repeated credence goods market in which experts provide treatment to customers. We assume that the history of transactions is recorded on a biased review platform that contains information only about treatments, and not about non- treatments. We also introduce the notion of a partial...

We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences. We show that the sender-optimal equilibrium is robust if and only if this equilibrium either reveals no information...

We consider a platform which provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for...