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Mechanim design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2012
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316927
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Generosity, Greed and Gambling: What difference doesasymmetric information in bargaining make?
Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009
We analyze the effects of asymmetric information concerning thesize of a pie on proposer behavior in three different bargaining situations:the ultimatum game, the Yes-No-game and the dictator game.Our data show that (a) irrespective of the information condition, proposergenerosity increases with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866401
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Generosity, greed and gambling : what difference does asymmetric information in bargaining make?
Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin - 2009
We analyze the effects of asymmetric information concerning the size of a pie on proposer behavior in three different bargaining situations: the ultimatum game, the Yes-No-game and the dictator game. Our data show that (a) irrespective of the information condition, proposer generosity increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003824174
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Mechanim design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - Revised version, April 2014
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354632
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Mechanism design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2016
We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore information structures that dier with respect to what is commonly known about the weight that agents attach to reciprocal kindness. When the designer has no information on reciprocity types, implementability of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444226
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Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games
Khalmetski, Kiryl - 2019
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)-type cheating games when agents have a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902152
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Mechanim design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2012 - This version: August 2012
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009743166
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Asymmetric information in simple bargaining games : an experimental study
Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - 2017
Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623050
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Truthful revelation mechanisms for simultaneous common agency games
Pavan, Alessandro; Calzolari, Giacomo - 2008
class of revelation mechanisms that, although it does not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, it … facilitates the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes that are typically of interest in applications (those sustained by … also equilibrium outcomes sustained by non-Markov strategies and/or mixed-strategy profiles. -- Mechanism design …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003860805
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Renegotiation-Proof Third-Party Contracts under Asymmetric Information
Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2012
This paper characterizes the equilibrium outcomes of two-stage games in which the second mover has private information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009526574