Similar Search Results

Kinateder, Markus - 2008

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270931

Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games

Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - 2013

We study the bilateral exchange of information in the context of linear quadratic games. An information structure is here represented by a non directed network, whose nodes are agents and whose links represent sharing agreements. We first study the equilibrium use of information in any given...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756291

Movers and Shakers

Akerlof, Robert - 2015

Most projects, in most walks of life, require the participation of multiple parties. While it is difficult to unite individuals in a common endeavor, some people, whom we call “movers and shakers,” seem able to do it. The paper specifically examines moving and shaking of an investment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017100

The swing voter's curse in social networks

Buechel, Berno; Mechtenberg, Lydia - 2017

We study private communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Some (or all) agents receive a private imperfect signal about which policy is correct. They can, but need not, recommend a policy to their neighbors in the social network prior to the vote. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599298

Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks

Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319

The evolution of reputation-based cooperation in regular networks

Sasaki, Tatsuya; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Okada, Isamu; … - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-16

. We comparatively analyze four of the leading moral assessment rules-shunning, image scoring, stern judging, and simple …. Discriminators rely on a proper moral assessment rule. By using individual-based models, we show that the four assessment rules are … among the four assessment rules in promoting cooperation in regular networks. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621316

On information aggregation and interim efficiency in networks

Jiménez-Martínez, Antonio - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-14

This paper considers a population of agents that are engaged in a listening network. The agents wish to match their actions to the true value of some uncertain (exogenous) parameter and to the actions of the other agents. Each agent begins with some initial information about the parameter and,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621465

Repeated Games Played in a Network

Kinateder, Markus - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219142

Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection

Jamison, Julian C. - 2012 - This version: January 11, 2012

Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a rationale for expecting Nash equilibrium in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511713

Asymmetric power and market failure : power hazard in exchange

Ertürk, Korkut A. - 2016

In simple textbook treatment of bilateral exchange traders end up on the contract curve such that the trading surplus is maximized regardless of any asymmetric bargaining power they might have. However, that need not be true when the terms of exchange are determined by uncooperative bargaining,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435708

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last