to adverse selection in insurance markets. However, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private … risk type for an individual subjective cost and show analytically how this affects insurance market equilibria as well as … digitalization. It shows that new technologies bring new ways to challenge crosssubsidization in insurance markets and stresses the …

We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand … dynamic contracts. An unconditional dynamiccontract has insurance companies offeringcontracts where the terms of the contract … on individualpast performance (like in car insurances). Weinvestigate whether allowing insurance companies to offer …

We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterized version … of the lemons' model (Akerlof 1970) in the insurance context predicts total crowding out of low-risks when insurers offer … a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) to solve this major …

We consider a model of competitive insurance markets involving both asymmetric information and ambiguity about the … accident probability. We show that there can exist a full-insurance pooling equilibrium. We also present an example where an … constraint and allows low risks to buy more insurance. Higher ambiguity also deteriorates the low risks' expected utility from …

We show that on-demand insurance contracts, an innovative form of coverage recently introduced through the InsurTech …

We analyze the effect of ambiguous loss probabilities on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information. We …

We examine insurance markets with two types of customers: those who regret suboptimal decisions and those who don.t. In … positive correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse … selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a negative correlation between the amount of insurance …

to a catastrophe. Distinct from the existing literature on insurance cycles, we model optimal contracting by competitive … insurance cycle …

and with competitive insurance models. We calculate a closed form solution for the CARA case and use it to illustrate … these differences. Although we focus on the monopoly insurance problem, our proofs can be adapted to other screening …