. Matching theory predicts that students' behavior in Chile should be strategic because they can list only up to eight options …A growing number of central authorities use assignment mechanisms to allocate students to schools in a way that … reflects student preferences and school priorities. However, most real-world mechanisms incentivize students to strategically …

We assume that students can acquire a wage premium, thanks to studies, and form a rational expectation of their future … earnings, which depends on personal ability. Students receive a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can … of test scores. Students optimally self-select as a result of pricing only. If capital markets are perfect but …

We assume that students can acquire a wage premium, thanks to studies, and form a rational expectation of their future … earnings, which depends on personal "ability". Students receive a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can … of test scores. Students optimally self-select as a result of pricing only. If capital markets are perfect but …

We assume that students can acquire a wage premium, thanks to studies, and form a rational expectation of their future … earnings, which depends on personal ability. Students receive a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can … of test scores. Students optimally self-select as a result of pricing only. If capital markets are perfect but …

We analyze a college admissions game with asymmetric information between students and colleges. Students' preferences … for colleges depend on the observable quality of the schools. In contrast, colleges' preferences for students depend on … the latter's abilities, which are private information. Students and schools are matched via a decentralized mechanism in …