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Strategic Trading and Unobservable Information Acquisition
Banerjee, Snehal - 2019
We allow a strategic trader to choose when to acquire information about an asset's payoff, instead of endowing her with it. When the trader dynamically controls the precision of a flow of information, the optimal precision evolves stochastically and increases with market liquidity. However,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012897901
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Financial Markets Where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices
Eyster, Erik - 2018
We model a financial market where some traders of a risky asset do not fully appreciate what prices convey about others' private information. Markets comprising solely such "cursed" traders generate more trade than those comprising solely rationals. Because rationals arbitrage distortions caused...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928331
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Potential output and fiscal rules in a monetary union under asymmetric information
Marattin, Luigi; Meraglia, Simone - 2015
We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information about member states' potential output and, therefore, output gap and (ii) bail-out among member states. In our framework, bail-out lowers the scope for signalling (discrimination) by member states...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011714310
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Potential output and fiscal rules in a monetary union under asymmetric information - 2nd ed
Marattin, Luigi; Meraglia, Simone - 2016 - 2nd edition
We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information on member states' potential output and (ii) bail-out among member states. The first-best deficit is contingent on the cycle, that is, on member states' output gap. In the presence of asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705510
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Potential Output and Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union Under Asymmetric Information
Marattin, Luigi - 2015
We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information about member states' potential output and, therefore, output gap and (ii) bail-out among member states. In our framework, bail-out lowers the scope for signalling (discrimination) by member states...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019233
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Potential Output and Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union Under Asymmetric Information – 2nd Ed
Marattin, Luigi - 2016
We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information on member states' potential output and (ii) bail-out among member states. The first-best deficit is contingent on the cycle, that is, on member states' output gap. In the presence of asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994210
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Does Cheap Talk Promote Coordination Under Asymmetric Information? An Experimental Study on Global Games
Duan, Jieyi - 2020
This study experimentally investigates the role of two-sided cheap talk in decisions under asymmetric information. Unlike previous studies, our study also considers endogenous investment timing. In our experiments, subjects play two-player global games with asymmetric information. Before making...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849211
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The mispricing of debt - influences of ratings on coordination
Ernstberger, Philip - In: Crisis, debt, and default : the effects of time …, (pp. 63-92). 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011622267
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Cheap talk with correlated signals
Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2013
one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders' equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326
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Cheap talk with correlated signals
Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2015
one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011774610