In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. Because experts provide both the diagnosis and the treatment, there is opportunity for fraud. We experimentally investigate how the intensity of price competition and the...

We analyze firms' ability to sustain collusion in a setting in which horizontally differentiated firms can price-discriminate based on private information regarding consumers' preferences. In particular, firms receive private signals which can be noisy (e.g., big data predictions). We find that...

We experimentally investigate the role of second opinions in markets where experts like doctors both diagnose and provide the services. Experts may exploit their informational advantage over customers and overtreat by providing a more costly and expensive treatment than necessary. We show that...

In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. Experts may exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert...

In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. Experts may exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert...