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Although physicians are often expected to be gatekeepers to health insurance benefits such as paid sick leave, research indicates a substantial reluctance to reject patient requests for sickness certificates. We show that private information on the patient's part creates a conflict between the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011647475
Although personalized medicine is becoming the new paradigm to manage some diseases, the economics of personalized medicine have only focused on assessing the efficiency of specific treatments, lacking a theoretical framework analyzing the interactions between pharmaceutical firms and healthcare...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011586604
We present a simple algorithm for computing an intuitive notion of MPE for finite state dynamic games with asymmetric information. The algorithm does not require: storage and updating of posterior distributions, explicit integration over possible future states to determine continuation values,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070473
The health care industry in some countries displays a gated structure. Rather than approaching a specialist directly, a patient will first seek a referral from a general practitioner. We provide one possible explanation for such an industry structure. If the outcome of treatment depends on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085990
Many service industries, including the medical and legal professions in some countries, display a gated structure. Rather than approaching a final producer directly, a consumer will first seek a referral from an intermediary. In this paper, we provide one possible explanation for such an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012718769
We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers are heterogeneous in … knowledge: some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered, some know only the prices and some know …-inefficiency of the price/quality offers. But, better price/quality combinations are signalled with lower prices in one type and with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376636
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012098275
A principal decides when to exercise a real option. A biased agent influences this decision by strategically disclosing information. Committing to disclose all information with delay is the optimal way to persuade the principal to wait. Without dynamic commitment, this promise is credible only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864710
reputation for quality, and a principal (e.g. a regulator) can learn the agent's quality via costly inspections. Monitoring plays …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865082
The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351