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Electoral competition when candidates are better informed than voters

Jensen, Thomas - 2009

In this paper we study the functioning of representative democracy when politicians are better informed than the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003874196

Political selection and the concentration of political power

Grunewald, Andreas; Hansen, Emanuel; Pönitzsch, Gert - 2015

voters' capacity to identify and empower well-suited politicians. In our model, candidates are heterogeneous in two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430775

To elect or to appoint? : bias, information, and responsiveness of bureaucrats and politicans

Iaryczower, Matiás; Lewis, Garrett; Shum, Matthew - In: Journal of public economics 97 (2013) 1, pp. 230-244

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009710449

Re-election through division

Morelli, Massimo; Van Weelden, Richard - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345049

Political selection and the concentration of political power : conference paper

Grunewald, Andreas; Hansen, Emanuel; Pönitzsch, Gert - 2014

voters' capacity to identify and empower competent politicians. In our model, candidates are privately informed about their … motivation. In particular, full concentration of power is desirable if and only if politicians are mostly welfare-oriented. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483274