exponential utility and cost of effort, each separating renegotiation-proof contract is characterized by a single "sensitivity …" parameter, which determines how the agent's promised utility varies with reported cash flows. The optimal contract among those … information revelation. -- Repeated Agency ; Asymmetric Information ; Persistent Information ; Contract Theory ; Principal Agent …

exponential utility and cost of effort, each separating renegotiation-proof contract is characterized by a single "sensitivity …" parameter, which determines how the agent's promised utility varies with reported cash flows. The optimal contract among those …, and information revelation. -- Repeated Agency ; Asymmetric Information ; Persistent Information ; Contract Theory …

exponential utility and cost of effort, each separating renegotiation-proof contract is characterized by a single “sensitivity …” parameter, which determines how the agent's promised utility varies with reported cash flows. The optimal contract among those …

about the asset? How do the disclosure rules of contract law influence the investigation decision? Shavell (1994) showed …-disclosure rule, which requires disclosure of material information, but only after the contract is concluded. We show that this rule … can be more efficient than both voluntary disclosure and mandatory (pre-contract) disclosure …

on the ex post payoff of the decision maker. The contract thus has to induce the experts to "monitor each other" by … making the transfers contingent on the entire vector of reports. We characterize the least costly contract that implements …

state of a project prior to investing in it. For a given level of investment, a good project succeeds with higher … considered: (i) complete contingent contracts in which compensation to the consultant may depend on reports, investment levels …