We examine a model of long-term contracting in which the buyer is privately informed about the stochastic process by which her value for a good evolves. In addition, the realized values are also private information. We characterize a class of environments in which the profit-maximizing long-term...

We derive the effect of plausible deniability on asset risk premia in a dynamic setting with correlated firm values, systematic risk, and risk-averse investors. Firms optimally exercise American disclosure options, which are more valuable due to the possibility that other correlated firms may...

We derive the effect of plausible deniability on asset risk premia in a dynamic setting with correlated firm values, systematic risk, and risk-averse investors. Firms optimally exercise American disclosure options, which are more valuable due to the possibility that other correlated firms may...

We derive the effect of plausible deniability on asset risk premia in a dynamic setting with correlated firm values, systematic risk, and risk-averse investors. Firms optimally exercise American disclosure options, which are more valuable due to the possibility that other correlated firms may...

We challenge the prevailing view that pure informational lobbying (in the absence of political contributions and evidence distortion or withholding) leads to better informed policymaking. In the absence of lobbying, the policymaker may prioritize the more-important or ex ante morepromising...