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A characteristic of many information markets is that consumers can cross-check information, i.e. observe several information sources. To explore this we build a model of market for information where information outlets can only report a coarse signal and face a distribution of consumers with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014039286
factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor competition and identifiability we add the possibility for clients to … identifiabilitiy (leading to several client-advisor interactions over the course of the game) or competition (allowing one advisor to …-telling under competition. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor competition and identifiability we add the possibility for clients to … (leading to several client-advisor interactions over the course of the game) or competition (allowing one advisor to have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation … factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor competition and identifiability, we add the possibility for clients to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
that restaurant owners are more willing to share wine lists with others if competition is limited or their wine list does …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636853
In economic approaches it is often argued that reputation considerations influence the behavior of individuals or firms … and that reputation influences the outcome of markets. Empirical evidence is rare though. In this contribution we argue … that a positive reputation of sellers should have an effect on selling prices. Analyzing auctions of popular DVDs at eBay …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365875
efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation … has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294835
efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation … has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271236
We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494
We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079