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Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - 2018

We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807

Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - In: Games and economic behavior 121 (2020), pp. 329-367

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430288

Disclosure of information under competition : an experimental study

Sheth, Jesal - 2019

The theory of voluntary disclosure of information posits that market forces lead senders to disclose information … adverse inferences about non-disclosed information. Previous research finds that receivers do not sufficiently infer non-disclosure … that competition between senders positively affects disclosure of information and receivers' welfare. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024603

The price of advice

Eső, Péter; Szentes, Balázs - 2004

We develop a model of consulting (advising) where the role of the consultant is that she can reveal signals to her client which refine the client’s original private estimate of the profitability of a project. Importantly, only the client can observe or evaluate these signals, the consultant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273821

Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading

Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - 2002

We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318890

Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission

de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325901

Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent

de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011

Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325937

A decentralized market with common values uncertainty : non-steady states

Blouin, Max; Serrano, Roberto - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504686

Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks

Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319

Persuasion with limited communication capacity

Treust, Maël le; Tomala, Tristan - 2017

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012106139

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