We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers are heterogeneous in knowledge: some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered, some know only the prices and some know neither. We show that two types of signalling...

We experimentally study the effect of information about competitors ́actions on cartel stability and firms ́incentives to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized information is available and participants cannot...

We analyze firms' ability to sustain collusion in a setting in which horizontally differentiated firms can price-discriminate based on private information regarding consumers' preferences. In particular, firms receive private signals which can be noisy (e.g., big data predictions). We find that...

We present a simple algorithm for computing an intuitive notion of MPE for finite state dynamic games with asymmetric information. The algorithm does not require: storage and updating of posterior distributions, explicit integration over possible future states to determine continuation values,...

We investigate a firm's pre-emptive behavior by comparing Cournot competition and Stackelberg games with one leader and multiple followers, where each firm has access to private information on stochastic demand. We show that the firm prefers pre-emptive quantity choice (Stackelberg leader) to...