The owner of a real option does not have the necessary expertise to manage the investment project and needs to contract with an expert in order to exercise the real option. The potential managers (the experts) have private information about their respective cost of investing in the project. The...

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in whichcorporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show thatrms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors usingthe timing of corporate...

This paper develops a tractable real options framework to analyze the eects of asym-metric information on investment and nancing decisions when rms require externalfunds to nance investment. Our analysis shows that corporate insiders can signal theirprivate information to outside investors using...

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of...

The paper presents an adverse selection-based explanation of the fact that some entrepreneurs choose to finance multiple projects together by issuing a single security and other entrepreneurs decide to finance each project separately. We consider the financing problem of an entrepreneur who has...

We ask whether the quality of internal information matters for investment decisions. We predict that investment is more sensitive to internal profit signals and less sensitive to external price signals when managers have higher quality internal information. Consistent with recent theoretical and...

This paper develops a signalling game in which the decision to raise public equityis a real option of the …rm. Firms may use multiple signals to reveal their type:the timing of the IPO, the fraction of shares issued and the underpricing of shares.The model provides a tractable approach for...

We ask whether the quality of internal information matters for investment decisions. We predict that investment is more sensitive to internal profit signals and less sensitive to external price signals when managers have higher quality internal information. Consistent with recent theoretical and...

I analyze a manager's decision to disclose private information when the stock market is a source of information for corporate investment-making. A manager with long-term incentives discloses her private information only if it crowds-in informed trading and increases the manager's ability to...

We consider a problem where an uninformed principal makes a timing decision interacting with an informed but biased agent. Because time is irreversible, the direction of the bias crucially affects the agent's ability to credibly communicate information. When the agent favors late...