Morck et al. (2000) argue that lack of private property protection discourages informed traders from capitalizing on firm private information which incorporates more market risk in stock returns. This paper extends Morck et al. (2000) investigations and suggests alternatively that firm corporate...

This study examines the effect of capitalizing acquired in-process research and development (IPR&D) on information asymmetry under Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 141 (R). SFAS 141R requires acquirers to fully recognize IPR&D at fair value as an indefinite-lived intangible asset...

We establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a generalized one-period Kyle (1985) model where insider trading can be subject to a penalty cost that is non-decreasing in the trade size.The result is obtained for uniform noise and holds for general penalty functions. Uniqueness is among...

We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information—the betweenness property that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides...

This paper studies information acquisition and use in network games. The network structure incorporates both strategic complements (positive links) and substitutes (negative links). An information-use game played on a correlation-adjusted network is derived. Equilibrium inefficiencies in both...

We build a game theoretical model to examine how the level of information advantage of insiders and the competition between insiders and sophisticated investors affect stock price movements and traders' trading strategies and profits. We show that the competition between insiders and...

We examine the strategies of different types of investors (the insider, the information follower, and the price follower) who have asymmetric information about future news events and how these strategies affect stock prices. We show that stock price jumps occur when the insider receives accurate...

We study a market with competition in schedules, such as in asset auctions or wholesale electricity markets, with boundedly rational sellers that partially neglect the informational content of the price. Using the cursed equilibrium concept, we find that the unique symmetric linear equilibrium...

The appearance of a Brownian term in the price dynamics on a stock market was interpreted in [De Meyer, Moussa-Saley (2003)] as a consequence of the informational asymmetries between agents. To take benefit of their private information without revealing it to fast, the informed agents have to...

This paper establishes an insider trading model under market supervision, which includes four types of trading entities: an insider trader, n external traders, noise traders, and market makers. The insider trader voluntarily discloses information to the external traders during the trading...