We examine the role of earnings management in explaining the properties of asset prices and stock market participation. We demonstrate that investors' uncertainty about the extent of manipulation can cause excess movements in stock price relative to fluctuations in output. When faced with...

The goal of this paper is to study how informational frictions affect asset liquidity in OTC markets in a laboratory setting. The experiments replicate an OTC market similar to the one used in monetary and financial economics (Shi, 1995; Trejos and Wright, 1995; Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen, 2005):...

Individual investors often neglect value-relevant accounting information and instead underperform by trading on technical trends. We investigate the frictions that impede individual investors' use of accounting information, and in particular their costs of monitoring and acquiring accounting...

Revisions of consensus forecasts of macroeconomic variables positively predict announcement day forecast errors, whereas stock market returns on forecast revision days negatively predict announcement day returns. A dynamic noisy rational expectations model with periodic macroeconomic...

We investigate the frictions that impede individual investors' use of accounting information and, in particular, their costs of monitoring and acquiring accounting disclosures. We do so using an archival setting in which individuals are presented with automated media articles that report both...

Can prices convey information about the fundamental value of an asset? This paper considers this problem in relation to the dynamic properties of the fundamental (whether it is constant or time-varying) and the structure of information available to agents. Risk-averse traders receive two...

We study information acquisition in dealer markets. We first identify a one-sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition: the more informed traders are, the larger market makers' gain from becoming informed. When quotes are observable, this effect in turn induces a strategic...

We study a dynamic voluntary disclosure setting where the manager's information and the firm's value evolve over time. The manager is not limited in her disclosure opportunities but disclosure is costly. The results show that the manager discloses even if this leads to a price decrease in the...

The paper contrasts theories that explain diverse belief by asymmetric private information (in short PI) with theories which postulate agents use subjective heterogenous beliefs (in short HB). We focus on problems where agents forecast aggregates such as profit rate of the Samp;P500 and our...

This paper studies information aggregation in financial markets with recurrent investor exit and entry. I consider a dynamic general equilibrium model of asset trading with private information and collateral constraints. Investors differ in their aversion to Knightian uncertainty: When...