We study mechanism design in dynamic nonmonetary markets where objects are allocated to unit-demand agents with private types and quasi-linear payoffs in their waiting costs. We consider a general class of mechanisms that determine the joint distribution of the object assigned to each agent and...

We study the role of transfers in the timing of matching. In our model, some agents have the option of matching early and exiting in period 1, before others arrive in period 2; in period 2 there is a centralized institution that implements a stable matching after all agents arrive. We prove that...

We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...

I model access to influence as a two-sided matching market between a continuum of experts and a finite number of gatekeepers under sequential directed search. Real-world examples include academic publishing, venture capitalism or political agenda setting. Uniqueness of the resulting equilibrium...

We introduce a simple model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically, and the composition of the trade network depends endogenously on the matching algorithm. Varying the timing properties of matching algorithms can substantially affect their...

Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...