Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 11,918
Cover Image
Information disclosure in elections with sequential costly participation
Vorobyev, Dmitriy - 2020
in terms of how it allows publication of intermediate election results including turnout and candidates' vote shares … during an election day. Using a pivotal costly voting model of elections in which voters have privately observed preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012221414
Cover Image
Tax Contracts and Elections
Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - 2010
In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199808
Cover Image
More or Less Data? Information Acquisition in Asymmetric Elections
Sharma, Priyanka; Wagman, Liad - 2020
We demonstrate that a candidate competing in an asymmetric Tullock election contest may prefer that their rival … function of the competitiveness of the election …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014096877
Cover Image
Voting advice applications and elections
Benesch, Christine; Heim, Rino L.; Schelker, Mark; … - 2021
We analyze how the introduction of the voting advice application (VAA) smartvote affects voter turnout, voting behavior and electoral outcomes. The Swiss context offers an ideal setting to identify the causal effects of online information with aggregate real world data because smartvote was...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012421257
Cover Image
Political selection and the concentration of political power
Grunewald, Andreas; Hansen, Emanuel; Pönitzsch, Gert - 2015
concentration of power in the hands of the election winner is optimal if and only if the conflict of interest is small. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430775
Cover Image
Political selection and the concentration of political power : conference paper
Grunewald, Andreas; Hansen, Emanuel; Pönitzsch, Gert - 2014
This paper studies the effects of power-concentrating institutions on the quality of political selection, i.e., the voters' capacity to identify and empower competent politicians. In our model, candidates are privately informed about their abilities and are driven by office rents as well as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483274
Cover Image
To Elect or to Appoint? Bias, Information, and Responsiveness of Bureaucrats and Politicians
Iaryczower, Matias; Lewis, Garrett; Shum, Matthew - 2012
In this paper, we address empirically the trade-offs involved in choosing between bureaucrats and politicians. In order to do this, we need to map institutions of selection and retention of public officials to the type of public officials they induce. We do this by specifying a collective...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194725
Cover Image
Board Bias, Information, and Investment Efficiency
Gregor, Martin; Michaeli, Beatrice - 2022
explores a new technology, business concept, or market. We find that only a board with sufficiently high anti-approval bias can … discipline the CEO's empire-building tendency and opportunistic reporting. A board with this bias, however, underinvests in … biased but their bias is less severe. Our model also predicts that boards overinvest in innovations and rely on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013313483
Cover Image
Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya - 2010
In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665138
Cover Image
Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya - 2010
In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008669935