In this paper we present results from experimental asset markets and simulations with traders who receive asymmetric information about the fundamental value of an asset. In the experimental markets with repetition insiders outperform the market and uninformed computerized random traders...

We study whether information about imminent future dividends can abate bubbles in experimental asset markets. Using the seminal design of Smith et al. (1988) we find that markets where traders are asymmetrically informed about future dividends have smaller, and shorter, bubbles than markets with...

We study the use of trading strategies and their profitability in experimental asset markets with asymmetrically informed traders. We find that insiders make most of their profits from trades which are initiated by their limit orders -- especially at the beginning of a period and when the change...

Status and reputation concerns are conjectured to be important especially in markets with information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, such as in credence goods markets. To investigate the effects of status and reputation on reciprocal behavior of sales personnel in a financial credence...