The paper considers an infinitely repeated competition between vertical manufacturer-retailer hierarchies. In every period, retailers privately observe the demand, consequently manufacturers pay retailers “information rents”. I compare between several collusive equilibria that differ in the...

We investigate the incentive for partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when the retailers are privately informed about their production costs and engage in differentiated good price competition. Partial vertical integration...

We investigate the impact of vertical price restraints on the free-entry equilibrium and its welfare properties in a vertically related market where manufacturer-retailer hierarchies compete under asymmetric information. We compare the legal regimes of laissez-faire and ban on resale price...

Information Technology has allowed vertically related firms to share sales forecasts, production schedules, inventory, etc. This fact motivated many studies on how the retailer’s superior knowledge of market conditions affects pricing and competition within different vertical restraints. But...

We examine vertical backward integration in a reduced-form model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and others remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Efficient firms are more likely to...

Digital platforms facilitate interactions between consumers and merchants that allow collection of profiling information which drives innovation and welfare. Private incentives, however, lead to information asymmetries resulting in market failures both on-platform, among merchants, and...

Digital platforms facilitate interactions between consumers and merchants that allow the collection of profiling information which drives innovation and welfare. Private incentives, however, lead to information asymmetries resulting in market failures both on-platform, among merchants, and...