We analyze a college admissions game with asymmetric information between students and colleges. Students' preferences … for colleges depend on the observable quality of the schools. In contrast, colleges' preferences for students depend on … the latter's abilities, which are private information. Students and schools are matched via a decentralized mechanism in …

-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is … not stable, and may make less informed students worse off. We attribute these results to curse of acceptance. However, we …, the outcome is stable, and less informed students are protected from the curse of acceptance. Our results have …

We assume that students can acquire a wage premium, thanks to studies, and form a rational expectation of their future … earnings, which depends on personal ability. Students receive a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can … of test scores. Students optimally self-select as a result of pricing only. If capital markets are perfect but …

We assume that students can acquire a wage premium, thanks to studies, and form a rational expectation of their future … earnings, which depends on personal "ability". Students receive a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can … of test scores. Students optimally self-select as a result of pricing only. If capital markets are perfect but …

We consider a simple model of the competitive screening of students by schools and colleges. Students apply to schools … which then perform costly screening procedures of the applicants to select those with high ability. Students who receive … more than one offer may choose among those. Colleges select students and can observe the school which they attended. We …