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Information Acquisition During a Dutch Auction
Miettinen, Paavo - 2010
In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed … auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting …, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196912
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Information Acquisition During a Dutch Auction
Miettinen, Paavo - 2012
In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed … auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting …, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109754
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Risk, reward and uncertainty in buyer-seller transactions : the seller's view on combining posted prices and auctions
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine - 2023
In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477420
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Tell the truth or not? : the Montero mechanism for emissions control at work
Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; … - 2019
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112503
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Tell the truth or not? : the Montero mechanism for emissions control at work
Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; … - 2018
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, grandfathering and pure auctioning. We conducted 27 treatments with a total of 623 participants,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787201
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Asymmetric information in auctions : are resellers better appraisers?
Koptyug, Nikita - 2016
heterogeneity in the dispersion of private value components. I use the asymmetric ascending auction model of Hong and Shum (2003) to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430656
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To Thine Own Self Be True : Asymmetric Information in Procurement Auctions
Wooten, Joel O.; Donohue, Joan M.; Fry, Timothy; … - 2020
mirrors real construction procurement auctions, our laboratory experiment tests the impact of the precision of a bidder’s cost … estimate and the degree to which bidders know the inherent cost estimate precisions in the auction. We find that more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033883
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Electricity markets : designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs
Holmberg, Pär; Wolak, Frank A. - 2015
We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410462
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Front-Running, Smart Contracts, and Candle Auctions
Häfner, Samuel; Stewart, Alistair - 2021
shill bidding in strategy-proof auctions more generally. As a remedy, this paper considers an ascending auction with a … random ending time --- a so-called candle auction. Time is discrete and in every round, the bidders bid sequentially and in a … fixed order. The bidder with the highest bid at the end of the decisive round wins the auction and pays her bid. We show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013227449
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Cheap Talk Advertising in Auctions
Jewitt, Ian; Li, Daniel Z. - 2021
This paper explores how a seller should transmit product information to bidders with horizontally differentiated preferences. Under cheap-talk, we show that, in an informative equilibrium, the seller provides less precise information for more popular product attributes. Second, for any given...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250400