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Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment
Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - 2018
We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807
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Strategic communication : an experimental investigation
Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014
other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085
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Can communication mitigate strategic delays in investment timing?
Mermer, Ayse; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2023
how communication mitigates this free-riding problem in an investment-timing game. In our baseline investment-timing game …. If more investors invest at the same time, they share the costs. In the communication treatment, subjects can freely … communicate before choosing the investment time. We find that in groups of two players, communication increases cooperation and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299600
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Costly miscalibration
Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 477-506
We consider a platform which provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587367
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Advice Is Cheap : Information Is Not!
Häfner, Samuel - 2018
An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the state of a project prior to investing in it. For a given level of investment, a good project succeeds with higher probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932515
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Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295
) equilibrium. Fully informative myopic and farsighted equilibria essentially take a particular simple form: all communication is … and analyze equilibrium welfare. Furthermore, we extend our model to public communication and investigate the implications …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319
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Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk : experts vs. quacks
Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019
The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351
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Preselection and expert advice
Schulte, Elisabeth; Felgenhauer, Mike - 2015
We study the effects of preselection on an expert's incentive to give truthful advice in a decision environment in which certain decisions yield more precise estimates about the expert's expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker can study the case before...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302441
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Bayesian signaling
Hedlund, Jonas - 2014
This paper introduces private sender information into a sender-receiver game of Bayesian persuasion with monotonic sender preferences. I derive properties of increasing differences related to the precision of signals and use these to fully characterize the set of equilibria robust to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010458265
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Hierarchical cheap talk
Ambrus, Attila; Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Kamada, Yuichiro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 1, pp. 233-261
example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686974