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. Iterative admissibility also provides predictions for every finite level of reasoning about rationality. Overall we observe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807
We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009728179
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This paper develops a dynamic theory of war and peace. In our framework, an aggressive country can forcibly extract … concessions from a non-aggressive country via war. Alternatively, it can avoid war and allow the non-aggressive country to make … private shock which deems concessions too costly. We show that the realization of war sustains concessions along the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224039
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This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009153832
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009259934
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008600
This paper performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents can condition on noisy prices in the rational expectations tradition. Price-contingent strategies introduce two externalities in the use of private information: a payoff (pecuniary) externality related to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011001