How does information asymmetry between firms regarding the quality (ability) of workers, determine the distribution of workers' qualities in those firms? We build a game theoretic model of information asymmetry between 2 representative firms competing in the labor market for labor inputs. In the...

We aim at some simple theoretical underpinnings for the study of a complex empirical question studied by labor economists and others: does Information-technology improvement lead to occupational shifts -- toward "information workers" and away from other occupations -- and to changes in the...

We study a winner-take-all R&D race where firms are privately informed about the uncertain arrival rate of the invention. Due to the interdependent-value nature of the problem, the equilibrium displays a strong herding effect that distinguishes our framework from war-of-attrition models....

We study a buyer's strategic use of a dual-sourcing option when facing suppliers possessing private information about their disruption likelihood. We solve for the buyer's optimal procurement contract. We show that the optimal contract can be interpreted as the buyer choosing between...

This paper studies how asymmetric information over inputs affects workers' response to incentives and self-selection at the workplace. Using daily records from a Peruvian egg production plant, we exploit a sudden change in the worker salary structure and find that workers' effort, firm profits,...

We aim at some simple theoretical underpinnings for a complex empirical question studied by labor economists and others: does Information-technology improvement lead to occupational shifts -- toward "information workers" and away from other occupations -- and to changes in the productivity of...