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on existing theories of competition in markets with adverse selection. -- Asymmetric information ; competition ; adverse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831629
We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterized version of the lemons' model (Akerlof 1970) in the insurance context predicts total crowding out of low-risks when insurers offer a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137823
design an experiment to examine the impact of competition and price transparency in such settings. Consistent with the … theoretical predictions, we find that competition promotes efficiency if bargainers cannot observe each other's price offers …. Contrary to the predictions, however, the efficiency-enhancing effect of competition persists even when offers are observable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854487
We consider an exchange economy in which a seller can trade an endowment of a divisible good whose quality she privately knows. Buyers compete in menus of non-exclusive contracts, so that the seller may choose to trade with several buyers. In this context, we show that an equilibrium always...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199733
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Riley (1979)'s reactive equilibrium concept addresses problems of equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection. The game-theoretic interpretation of the reactive equilibrium concept in Engers and Fernandez (1987) yields the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976)/Riley (1979)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010419870
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011553079
In this paper we allude to a novel role played by the non-linear income tax system in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market due to asymmetric information between workers and firms. We show that an appropriate choice of the tax schedule enables the government to affect the wage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011289068
The value of information regarding risk class for a monopoly insurer and its customers is examined in both symmetric and asymmetric information environments. A monopolist always prefers contracting with uninformed customers as this maximizes the rent extracted under symmetric information while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300312
We extend Akerlof (1970)'s 'Market for Lemons' by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is on display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes' rule but take the noisy signal at face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342215