affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than … under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts. …

private information truthfully before voting takes place. Depending on the distance between two feasible public good levels …, the optimal mechanism involves either one or two voting rounds. We show that procedural efficiency cannot be achieved by … communication among all citizens prior to voting. Finally, we outline several applications of the mechanism. …

voting settings. We investigate this issue in an informational voting setting, in which some voters are uninformed and face … predictions using a simple model of strategic voting in which some voters receive a psychological benefit (along the lines of … model hold in the data, particularly strongly for compulsory voting. In particular, both under compulsory and voluntary …

private information truthfully before voting takes place. Depending on the distance between two feasible public good levels …, the optimal mechanism involves either one or two voting rounds. We show that procedural efficiency cannot be achieved by … communication among all citizens prior to voting. Finally, we outline several applications of the mechanism …