We argue that when externalities such as pollution are nonexcludable, agents must be compelled to participate in a “mechanism” to ensure a Pareto-efficient outcome. We survey some of the main findings of the mechanism-design (implementation-theory) literature – such as the Nash...

If communication involves some transactions cost to both sender and recipient, what policy ensures that correct messages - those with positive social surplus - get sent? Filters block messages that harm recipients but benefit senders by more than transactions costs. Taxes can block positive...

We study an economy subject to recurrent disasters when agents have imprecise information about the frequency and duration of the disasters. Uncertainty about the persistence of states can lead to seemingly pessimistic behavior in bad times and optimistic behavior in good times. In a disaster,...

We show that on-demand insurance contracts, an innovative form of coverage recently introduced through the InsurTech sector, can serve as a screening device. To this end, we develop a new adverse selection model consistent with Wilson (1977), Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978). Consumers have...

I discuss some key issues raised by behavioral economics for better understanding the working of the labor market. Amongst the key points in this paper are: (i) a revised modeling of the labor supply curve, with a specific focus on the target income approach (ii) elaborating on the importance of...

We study an economy subject to recurrent disasters when agents have imprecise information about the frequency and duration of the disasters. Uncertainty about the persistence of states can lead to seemingly pessimistic behavior in bad times and optimistic behavior in good times. In a disaster,...

How does public and private information affect equilibrium and welfare in an economy with investment complementarities? And what is the optimal transparency in the information disseminated by economic data or policy announcements? When complementarities are weak so that the equilibrium is always...

Recognizing spam as a pollution problem points to a market-based approach that could be more effective than prior approaches based on either technology or law. Combining insights from externality economics and information asymmetry, I argue that an imperfect market can create more value for...

The paper starts with a description of major reforms of EU policy in the network industries. Based on the normative economics of regulation, it then points out generic information and transaction cost problems of regulatory policy making. An appropriate allocation of regulatory competencies may...

Global games of regime change that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We...