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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003384119
When politicians are short-term oriented or future elections do not sufficiently reflect the success of past policies, democratic elections cannot motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321142
We consider a model with a politician facing a multi-task problem while in office. The reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others. We show that a hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014145815
When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397764
proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may …, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is … usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter. -- Asymmetric information ; coalition governments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003784367
In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199808
This paper studies coalition formation under asymmetric information. An outside party offers private payments in order … information. The paper demonstrates that a supermajority coalition induces truth-telling and secures the implementation of the … decision for a price close to the full information minimal winning coalition price. On the contrary, if the minimal winning …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011490230
We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894591
This paper studies a large majority election with voters who have heterogeneous, private preferences and exogenous private signals. We show that a Bayesian persuader can implement any state-contingent outcome in some equilibrium by providing additional information. In this setting, without the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012614794
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779933