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We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title - courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012732731
Property rights are undoubtedly among the most important institutions for economic efficiency. Still, by looking at reality we usually see property rights only imperfectly enforced. In this paper we identify uncertainty faced by an enforcer to be sufficient to explain this observation. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009240307
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003589933
We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title - courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write.We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012735522
We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012771140
We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title - courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014211029
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001743033
low quality (that is, not co-conspirators at all but government agents). The economic theory of asymmetric information can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043981
This paper considers a model in which an activist or terrorist uses violence to signal commitment to a political agenda. We examine how this violent signaling may be countered and reduced by the use of information-gathering mechanisms. Signaling through violent activism does not necessarily...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014118712
We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950459