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Whom should an interest group lobby in a legislature? I develop a model of informational lobbying in which a legislature must decide on the allocation of a local publicly-provided good across districts. An interest group chooses sequentially to search and provide information on districts'...
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with two legislators (under majority rule) than with one (who has veto power), because competition between the legislators …
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Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties...
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I develop a theory of intermediation in a market where agents meet bilaterally to trade and buyers cannot commit to … hindered by the risk of default. Intermediation is a robust equilibrium feature, generated by asymmetric punishing strategies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806606
At the start of their term, politicians often announce which issue they intend to address. To shed light on this agenda setting, we develop a model in which a politician has to decide whether or not to address a public issue. Addressing an issue means that the politician investigates the issue...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326387
The paper considers public funding of political parties when some voters are poorly informed about parties? candidates and campaigns are informative. For symmetric equilibria, it is shown that more public funding leads parties to chose more moderate candidates, and that an increase in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320992
With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285358