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We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known heterogeneous biases. We test models assuming respectively self-interested and strategic-, joint payoff-maximizing- and cognitively heterogeneous agents. These predict varying degrees...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444227
We consider a model with a politician facing a multi-task problem while in office. The reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others. We show that a hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014145815
When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397764
We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894591
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012109384
fundamental and strategic uncertainty. I find that market does not improve coordination because the expectation that coordination … failures will occur is self-fulfilling, while cheap talk improves coordination because the signals of willingness to invest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079088
In this paper, we address empirically the trade-offs involved in choosing between bureaucrats and politicians. In order to do this, we need to map institutions of selection and retention of public officials to the type of public officials they induce. We do this by specifying a collective...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194725
uncertainty in the framework of a 2x2 coordination game, in which one choice leads to the same payoff regardless of the action of … the other person's play. Cheap talk is found to be effective, as there is much more coordination in both Signal treatments … coordination when messages are permitted. However, in the No Signal treatments, the round-to-round changes in choices induced by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122582
When groups face difficult problems, the voice of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We present results from a 'naturally noisy' setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the 'expert's voice is lost' to such a degree that it is in fact optimal for all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012257743
When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We present results from a "naturally noisy" setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert's voice was "lost" to such a degree that bringing forward even more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432144