We study a drop-shipping supply chain in which the retailer receives a customer's order and the supplier fills it. In such a chain, the supplier keeps inventory and bears inventory risks; the retailer focuses on marketing and customer acquisition, and forwards the orders to the supplier. The...

We begin with a supplier (she) who wholesales to a retailer (he), and is considering to encroach into the retail market by opening an independent online/offline store to sell directly to consumers (a direct channel encroachment) or by selling directly to consumers through the online platform of...

A critical assumption in the vast literature on inventory management has been that the current level of inventory is known to the decision maker. Some of the most celebrated results such as the optimality of base-stock policies have been obtained under this assumption. Yet it is often the case...

We analyze a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier's unit production cost, which characterizes his type, is only privately known to him. When trading with the retailer, the supplier demands a reservation profit that depends on his unit production cost. We model this...

We consider a decentralized supply chain where a supplier sells goods to a retailer facing a general random demand over an infinite horizon. The retailer satisfies the demand to the extent of the inventory on hand. The retailer has private information about his inventory in each period and the...

Using a vertically related multi-layer newsvendors framework this paper analyzes the impacts of market uncertainties and asymmetric information between firms at successive stages of a supply chain on their optimal stocking (and/or pricing) decisions. The asymmetric information along the supply...

We consider jointly replenishing n ex--ante identical firms that operate under an EOQ like setting using a non-cooperative game under asymmetric information. In this game, each firm, upon being privately informed about its demand rate (or inventory cost rate), submits a private contribution to...

We study how short-term informational advantages can be monetized in a high-frequency setting, when large inventories are explicitly penalized. We find that if most of the additional information is revealed regardless of the high-frequency traders' actions, then fast inventory management allows...

We consider a decentralized supply chain in which a downstream manufacturer purchases components from an upstream supplier privileged with private information about supply disruption risk. The supplier's initial reliability, asymmetric to the manufacturer, is either low or high. We examine two...