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What information should courts utilize when assessing contract damages? Should they award damages that were rationally foreseeable at the ex ante stage (ex ante expected damages)? Or should they award damages at the ex post level, incorporating new information revealed after contracting (ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013039212
In this paper, a setting of bilateral selfish reliance investments and post contractual two-sided asymmetric information is explored. Since the pioneering work of Rogerson (1992) and Hermalin-Katz (1993), it is by now well known that the comprehensive contracts can implement the first best even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204107
The franchisor-franchisee relationship is unique in that it has characteristics of both an arm's length business transaction as well as an ongoing business relationship. As time goes by, however, the interests of the parties may diverge. It is in the franchisees' interest to make their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050746
This chapter considers the landmark family property decisions of the House of Lords in Pettitt v. Pettitt [1970] AC 777 and Gissing v. Gissing [1971] AC 886 through the prism of imputed common intention, an idea advanced by Lord Diplock in Pettitt and (on one view) implemented in a different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013090101
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In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371083
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571
In the early models of incomplete contract neither party used to invest in the subject matter of the contract; those models primarily kept their focus on analyzing the effect of legal rules on parties' incentives to trade or to breach. The modern models stretched beyond that to include value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723830
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