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On the economic efficiency of energy conservation programs

Wirl, Franz - In: Selected papers of the Symposium on Operations Research …, (pp. 427-432). 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001320978

Incentivizing energy efficiency under private information : the social optimum

Wirl, Franz - In: The energy journal 40 (2019) 6, pp. 1-22

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181467

Managementprobleme bedingt durch Umweltpolitik bei asymmetrischer Information

Wirl, Franz - In: Zwei Sichtweisen auf das Umweltproblem : neoklassische …, (pp. 349-374). 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001455491

Managementprobleme bedingt durch Umweltpolitik bei asymmetrischer Information

Wirl, Franz - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004333575

Environmental incentives facing private information

Wirl, Franz - In: Environment and development economics 27 (2022) 2, pp. 167-183

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013166176

Entitling the pollutee: the polluter pays principle and injunctions under asymmetric information

Wirl, Franz; Huber, Claus - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000662145

Voluntary approaches to pigovian externalities under asymmetric information : (externalities and private information)

Huber, Claus; Wirl, Franz - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000613332

Joint implementation : strategic reactions and possible remedies

Wirl, Franz - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 12 (1998) 2, pp. 203-224

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001247655

The polluter pays versus the pollutee pays principle under asymmetric information

Huber, Claus - In: Journal of environmental economics and management : … 35 (1998) 1, pp. 69-87

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001239008

International environmental agreements : incentive contracts with multilateral externalities

Helm, Carsten; Wirl, Franz - 2011

We consider how one party can induce another party to join an international emission compact given private information. Due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent. This leads to a number of non-standard features: Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010438696