For companies, it is essential to obtain information about customers' preferences to successfully market their products and services. Experimental auctions are a promising method for acquiring such information considering that they are incentive compatible and non-hypothetical. Their...

Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality-robustness, which addresses players' motives to affect other players' monetary payoffs. One example is externalities...

Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality-robustness, which addresses players' motives to affect other players' monetary payoffs. One example is externalities...

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...

Breeders face the challenging task of tailoring crop varieties to complex consumer preferences shaped through culture and history. The Casamance rice sector in Senegal is an interesting case; while the region is endowed with a 3,000-year-old cultural heritage of African rice domestication, it has...

Reducing Africa's dependence on Asian rice imports requires tailoring local rice products to food markets that are segmented by cultural heritage of ancient rice domestication and colonial heritage of more recent import substitution policies. Using experimental auctions, we examine quality...

Shill bidding is a fraudulent in-auction strategy where a seller participates as a bidder in his own auctions. This is the first paper on shill bidding that is based on a data set which includes personal details. Along with bidding histories, I can prove that on the investigated platform 0.3% of...

We run a large field experiment with an online company specializing in selling used automobiles via ascending auctions. We manipulate experimentally the “price grid,” or the possible amounts that bidders can bid above the current standing price. Using two diverse auction sites, one in New...