The paper proposes a simple model of auctions with an impatient seller who chooses the reserve price and the buy-it-now (BIN) price to maximize revenue. The three main sales channels in the online auction (the pure auction, the BIN auction, and the fixed-price sale) are each shown to be an...

This research examines how the intensity of the dynamic competitive interaction with other bidders in ascending auctions influences consumers' willingness to pay for auctioned products. It focuses on one important aspect of this interaction – the speed of competitor reaction. The key...

With $40BB in annual gross merchandise volume, electronic auctions comprise a substantial and growing sector of the retail economy. Using unique data on Celtic coins, we estimate a structural model of buyer and seller behavior via MCMC with data augmentation. Results indicate that buyer...

Little research has been conducted on a common phenomenon in today’s online environment: the concurrent selling of identical products in online auctions. To fill this gap, the current research proposes a game-theoretical model to analyze the seller’s optimal strategy for selling two...

Beauty contests are auction mechanisms used to buy-or-sell differentiated products. Beauty contests are widely used in procuring welfare-to-work projects, freelance services, in selling online ads, in real-estate transactions, and in hiring, dating/marriage decisions. Unlike price-only auctions,...

This study investigates the reference price effect of historical price lists - which are provided in the auction description - on ending prices. This paper estimates and compares three different theories for the reference price effect of price lists: adaptation-level theory, range theory and...

Retailers selling items through Internet auctions frequently use buy-now prices (BNPs), which allow the immediate selling of an item to consumers at a fixed price. Previous research has proposed several theories of the usage of BNPs by bidders. We study the usage of BNPs from a seller's point of...

Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we...

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when...

In this paper the sequence of winning bids in the public auction of used cars in New Jersey is examined for the presence of price anomalies. Unlike many studies of heterogeneous objects where the effect of the order of sale on the price may not be credibly identified, the effect of the order is...