In this paper, we seek to determine if auctions can be used to select players according to their level-k types. To do so, we embed auctions into the p- beauty contest game. We find that by using different designs, we can get the auction winners to be either the lower level-k types or the higher...

If bidders are uncertain about their value when they participate in an auction, they may overbid and suffer ex-post losses. Limited liability mitigates these losses, and may result in more aggressive bidding and higher seller revenue, but also in an inefficient allocation. Using a combination of...

This paper provides an experimental analysis of a simultaneous energy-emissions market under conditions of market power. The experimental design employs real-world institutional features; including stochastic demand, permit banking, inter-temporal (multi-round) dynamics, a tightening cap, and...

State and regional governments in the U.S. and abroad are looking to market-based approaches to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions from the electric sector, and in the U.S. as a compliance approach to meeting the aggressive targets of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)'s Clean Power...

We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed-bid vs. closed clock vs. open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous vs. sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi-unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission...

We experimentally implement security-bid auctions, which are used around the world to sell projects that generate large future cash flows that are stochastic. Buyers make bids with debt and equity, linking payments to the project's ex-post revenue. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, we...

The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we...

In second price internet auctions with a fixed end time, such as those on eBay, many bidders "snipe", i.e., they submit their bids in the closing minutes or seconds of an auction. Late bids of this sort are much less frequent in auctions that are automatically extended if a bid is submitted very...

The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we...

Full-surplus-extraction auctions designed by Crémer and McLean (1988) have been criticized as unrealistic mechanisms. We assess the performance of these auctions in a controlled experimental environment. The experiment has two treatments: first-price and second-price auctions supplemented with...