I propose a Bayesian method to analyze bid data from first-price auctions under private value paradigms. I use a series representation to specify the valuation density so that bidding monotonicity is always satisfied, and I impose density affiliation by the nonparametric technique of Beresteanu...

We develop a model which combines general risk-averse preferences with anticipated loss aversion to explain bidding behavior in the first-price auction, where both risk-aversion and loss aversion induce ‘overbidding.' We then show that the nonparametric utility function and loss aversion...

We study the identification and estimation of first-price auctions with independent private values if bidders face ambiguity about the valuation distribution and have maxmin expected utility. Using variation in the number of bidders we nonparametrically identify the true valuation distribution...

We study a model that combines bidder-specific risk-averse preferences with anticipated loss aversion to explain bidding in induced value first-price auctions. We first show that, like risk-aversion, loss aversion causes ‘overbidding,’ relative to the bidding without risk and loss aversion....

We run experiments of first-price auctions with two groups, by which we directly detect the presence of bidders’ loss-aversion. Each human bidder bids against three preprogrammed computer bidders. The computer bidders independently draw their values from the uniform distribution and bid their...