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A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304385
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781653
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010821
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001127320
itself at the time of settlement, has been the impetus behind a number of class-action reform proposals. This Article … settlement. The idea is to allow the court, once a settlement has been achieved, to put the class’s claims up for auction, with … the settlement acting as reserve price. An entity that outbids the settlement becomes owner of the class’s claims, and may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014147098
We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950459
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We develop a novel theory of real estate foreclosure auctions, which have the special feature that the lender acts as a seller for low and as a buyer for high prices. The theory yields several empirically testable predictions concerning the strategic behavior of the agents, both under symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345757
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009757125
This paper analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction. I derive the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome for a large class of cumulative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339410