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informational externalities (PIE). This assumption implies upward drifting price sequences at sequential auctions, which is … environment, in which the bidders' values can exhibit both PIE and NIE (negative informational externalities). The case of NIE can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441724
We scrutinize the scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities by using …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024732
A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to each group, which is not commonly known. We investigate an auction mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065955
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to …. -- Fixed and Random Matching ; Incomplete Information ; Ex-Post Regret Learning ; Nash Equilibrium ; Ex-Post Equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967
This paper shows that in online car auctions, resellers are better at appraising the value of the cars they are bidding on than are consumers. Using a unique data set of online car auctions, I show that differences in bidding behavior between resellers and consumers can be explained by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430656
strategy relative to more traditional learning dynamics, and establish that, paradoxically, when sellers are strategic, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065183
, learning through experimentation, or a preference for variety. The analysis uncovers the key tradeoffs that platforms face in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011858085
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142432
paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second … independently from the identity of the winner. We prove that the first-price auction is not affected by this kind of price-externalities … by the presence of such price-externalities. In any case, in comparison with the first-price auction, the second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591224
This paper analyzes the law and economics of insider trading in the context of takeover bids, focusing on the European regulatory framework. We distinguish between trading by the bidder, by the target and by classical insiders and first address the issue of precisely when information about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013090185