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Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study
Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018
no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency … experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
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Selling to the mean
Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2015
We study optimal selling strategies of a seller who is poorly informed about the buyer’s value for the object. When the maxmin seller only knows that the mean of the distribution of the buyer's valuations belongs to some interval then nature can keep him to payoff zero no matter how much...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298549
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The design of ambiguous mechanisms
Di Tillio, Alfredo; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2014
This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399062
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A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence
Chung, Kim-sau; Olszewski, Wojciech - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 4, pp. 469-487
We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702275
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Mechanisms with referrals: VCG mechanisms and multilevel mechanisms
Lee, Joosung - 2017
We study mechanisms for environments in which only some of the agents are directly connected to a mechanism designer and the other agents can participate in a mechanism only through the connected agents' referrals. In such environments, the mechanism designer and agents may have different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660366
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Preemptive Bidding and Pareto Efficiency in Takeover Auctions
Dodonova, Anna - 2017
This paper extends the Fishman (1988) model of preemptive jump bidding in private value takeover auction to auctions with common and affiliated values. We show that in the presence of a common value component, jump bidding equilibrium results in higher social surplus. Furthermore, we show that,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956628
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An equilibrium analysis of Knaster’s fair division procedure
Van Essen, Matthew - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 21-37
In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948)). This procedure was designed to efficiently and fairly allocate multiple indivisible items when participants report their valuations truthfully. In equilibrium, players do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753712
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Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
Hain, Roland; Mitra, Manipushpak - 2001
In this paper we analyze sequencing situations under incomplete information where agents have interdependent costs. We first argue why Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (or VCG) mechanism fails to implement a simple sequencing problem in dominant strategies. Given this impossibility, we try to implement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538943
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Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
Mitra, Manipushpak - 2001 - Revised on March 2001
mechanism that extracts the private information and achieves efficiency with a transfer scheme that adds up to zero in every …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539813
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Ignorance is Bliss : Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller
Lamping, Jennifer - 2010
In many auctions, matching between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties. However, information about the quality of the match may be incomplete. We consider the case in which each bidder observes the quality of his match with the seller but the seller does not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139399