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Inverse adverse selection : the market for gems

Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - 2010

-value goods (lemons). We investigate the consequences of this inverse adverse selection and its potential solutions. The … uninformed buyer in a traditional market for lemons experiences the quality of the good he purchased; instead, the uninformed … the lemons problem often ineffective in the gems case. We further explore the theoretical and practical appeal of m arket …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382752

Asymmetric solutions to asymmetric information problems

Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - In: International review of law and economics 66 (2021), pp. 1-8

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012625567

Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching : the case of private values

Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2010

In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967

Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator

Matros, Alexander; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2010

We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008659956

Full Surplus Extraction and within-period Ex Post Implementation in Dynamic Environments

Noda, Shunya - 2019

We study full surplus extraction and implementation in dynamic environments. We exploit intertemporal correlations of agents' types to construct within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. First, we formulate one-shot environments, in which a single agent has a hidden type and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905050

Contest Architecture with Public Disclosures

Hinnosaar, Toomas - 2019

I study optimal disclosure policies in sequential contests. A contest designer chooses at which periods to publicly disclose the efforts of previous contestants. I provide results for a wide range of possible objectives for the contest designer. While different objectives involve different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012869576

Optimal Sequential Contests

Hinnosaar, Toomas - 2018

I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has a range of applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928173

Fighting collusion : an implementation theory approach

Azacis, Helmuts; Vida, Péter - 2021

A competition authority has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is implementable if inequilibrium, the firms cannot collude on their reports to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012602309

Dynamic Auctions : A Survey

Bergemann, Dirk - 2010

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents or buyers whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents or buyers whose private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146386

Auctions, actions, and the failure of information aggregation

Atakan, Alp; Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2012

We study a market in which k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n k bidders each demand one object. Before the auction, each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world. The good that is auctioned is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009632293

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