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We develop a model of vertical mergers with open auctions upstream. This setting may be appropriate for industries where inputs are procured via auction-like “requests for proposal.” For example, Drennan et al (2020) reports that a model of this type was used during the CVS-Aetna merger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082925
An auction framework is examined where each seller is uncertain about whether or not he will have a good available to sell. A timely example includes the auctioning off of radio spectrum by licensed primary users to unlicensed secondary users. A licensed primary user may not use the spectrum all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013022525
This paper studies the design of mechanisms that are robust to misspecification. We introduce a novel notion of robustness that connects a variety of disparate approaches and study its implications in a wide class of mechanism design problems. This notion is quantifiable, allowing us to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241735
Standard economic models of groundwater management impose restrictive assumptions regarding perfect transmissivity (i.e., the aquifer behaves as a bathtub), no external effects of groundwater stocks, observability of individual extraction rates, and/or homogenous agents. In this article, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013127685
Standard economic models of groundwater management impose restrictive assumptions regarding perfect transmissivity (i.e., the aquifer behaves as a bathtub), no external effects of groundwater stocks, observability of individual extraction rates, and/or homogenous agents. In this article, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008934668
We examine the impact of an incumbent carrier's participation in an auction set-aside for non-incumbents that was conducted simultaneously with an auction that was open to all carriers. We estimate the extent to which prices in the closed auction were inflated by the participation of incumbents....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014088192
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A common assumption in the analysis of symmetric auctions is that the bidders' value estimates exhibit positive informational externalities (PIE). This assumption implies upward drifting price sequences at sequential auctions, which is challenged by an empirical regularity, known as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441724