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Inefficient rushes in auctions
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 273-306
because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855888
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Information disclosure by a seller in a sequential first-price auction
Azacis, Helmuts - 2017
I study a sequential first-price auction where two items are sold to two bidders with private binary valuations. A seller, prior to the second auction, can publicly disclose some information about the outcome of the first auction. I characterize equilibrium strategies for various disclosure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689443
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Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study
Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018
no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency … experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
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The Efficiency of Competitive Mechanisms Under Private Information
Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Smorodinsky, Rann - 2012
We consider the efficiency properties of exchange economies where privately informed traders behave strategically …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014172021
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No price envy in the multi-unit object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences
Shinozaki, Hiroki - 2022
propose a new property of fairness: no price envy. It extends the standard no envy test (Foley, 1967) over bundles to prices … (per-unit payments), and requires no agent envy other agents' prices to his own in the sense that if he has a chance to … no price envy and no subsidy for losers if and only if it is an inverse uniform-price rule. Then, we identify the unique …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012880250
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Rent-seeking contests under symmetric and asymmetric information
Wasser, Cédric - 2010
We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950459
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Foreclosure auctions
Niedermayer, Andreas; Shneyerov, Artyom; Xu, Pia - 2015 - This Draft: May 19, 2015
We develop a novel theory of real estate foreclosure auctions, which have the special feature that the lender acts as a seller for low and as a buyer for high prices. The theory yields several empirically testable predictions concerning the strategic behavior of the agents, both under symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345757
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Optimal selling mechanisms under imperfect commitment : extending to the multi-period case
Beccuti, Juan I. - 2014
This paper studies the optimal mechanism for a seller (she) that sells, in a sequence of periods, an indivisible object per period to the same buyer (he). Buyer's willingness to pay remains constant along time and is his private information. The seller can commit to the current period mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402241
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Optimal selling mechanisms under imperfect commitment
Beccuti, Juan I. - 2014
This paper studies the optimal mechanisms for a seller with imperfect commitment who puts up for sale one individual unit per period to a single buyer in a dynamic game. The buyer's willingness to pay remains constant over time and is his private information. In this setting, the seller cannot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402248
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Sweet lemons : mitigating collusion in organizations
Pollrich, Martin; Negenborn, Colin von - 2018
This paper shows that the possibility of collusion between an agent and a supervisor imposes no restrictions on the set of implementable social choice functions (SCF) and associated payoff vectors. Any SCF and any payoff profile that are implementable if the supervisor's information was public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011902729