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We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is “connected” to a set of contests and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under the Tullock contest success function and explore how behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919103
Buyer-seller networks where price is determined by an ascending-bid auction are important in many economic examples such as certain real estate markets, radio spectrum sharing, and buyer-supplier networks. However, it may be that some sellers are better off not participating in the auction. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013022524
of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When … firms' relationships do not exhibit a supply chain structure, stable allocations need not exist. By contrast, in the … presence of supply chain structure, a natural substitutability condition characterizes the maximal domain of firm preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146534
Buyer-seller networks where price is determined by an ascending-bid auction are important in many economic examples such as certain real estate markets, radio spectrum sharing, and buyer-supplier networks. However, it may be that some sellers are better off not participating in the auction. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550488
We present a general model of bidding behavior in wildlife corridor auctions. Given (i) some spatial configuration of landowners in a landscape, (ii) the landowners' opportunity costs, and (iii) the value of establishing the corridor, our model predicts individual landowners' bids, overall...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011636462
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733006
We present a general model of bidding behavior in wildlife corridor auctions. Given (i) some spatial configuration of landowners in a landscape, (ii) the landowners' opportunity costs, and (iii) the value of establishing the corridor, our model predicts individual landowners' bids, overall...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012959334
We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325053
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