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Sequential procurement with contractual and experimental learning

Gur, Yonatan; Macnamara, Gregory; Saban, Daniela - 2019

We study the design of sequential procurement strategies that integrate stochastic and strategic information. We … buyer makes a price offer to a seller who has private, persistent information regarding his cost and quality of provision … the buyer's outside option, the buyer uses one form of information: either strategic or stochastic. If both seller types …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065183

Implementation with Interdependent Valuations (Second Version)

McLean, Richard P. - 2013

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087801

Implementation with interdependent valuations

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132

Contests with Ex-Ante Target Setting

Robertson, Matthew J. - 2019

I study contests in which each player is ranked by a scoring rule based on both her performance and how close this performance is to a private target, set before the contest. Each player's decision problem is to choose her target when performance is subject to a random component. I analyse the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012862676

Implementation with Interdependent Valuations

McLean, Richard P. - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734128

The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces

Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - 2017 - This version: February 8, 2017

McAfee and Reny (1992) have given a necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction in naive type spaces with a continuum of payoff types. We generalize their characterization to arbitrary abstract type spaces and to the universal type space and show that in each setting, full...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011604046

Signaling in Auctions Among Competitors

von Scarpatetti, Benedikt; Wasser, Cédric - 2010

We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196760

Stochastic-Share Contests

Brookins, Philip; Smyth, Andrew - 2022

This paper proposes the Stochastic-Share Contest, a novel contest format that combines the Winner-Take-All Contest and the Proportional-Prize Contest, with the former nesting the latter two as special cases. Motivated by the experimental contest literature, we include risk aversion and a "joy of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014080727

Mechanisms with Referrals : VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms

Lee, Joosung - 2017

wants to elicit the agents' private information about both preferences and network connections. As a benchmark for an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954132

Spying in Contests

Chen, Zhuoqiong (Charlie) - 2019

Two players with independent private values compete for a prize in an all-pay contest. Before the contest, each player can spy on the opponent by privately acquiring a costly, noisy, and private signal about his private value. In a symmetric equilibrium of the contest where players spy on each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902624