Showing 1 - 10 of 15
Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able contestant in favor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008906067
Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able contestant in favor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009408046
Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of bidders with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able bidder in favor of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403250
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009124788
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008909134
Contest designers or managers who want to maximize the overall revenue of a contest (relative performance scheme) are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011638535
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001335737
We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011437881
We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of their efforts. We assume that student preferences are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010413636
Choice between different versions of a game may provide a means of sorting, allowing players with different preferences to self-select into groups of similar types. We experimentally investigate whether auctioning off the right to play a prisoner’s dilemma game in which the cost of unilateral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612572