Showing 1 - 10 of 643
This paper analyses the cost-effectiveness of agri-environmental auctions that solicit two-dimensional bids consisting of conservation activity and compensation payment. Taking a self-selecting contract schedule as a benchmark, an optimally designed auction has the potential to reduce government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213529
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for mechanism design with limited commitment. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of any equilibrium in a mechanism-selection game between an uninformed designer and a privately informed agent. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014110159
Principals seek to enter into a productive relationship with agents by posting mechanisms in a market with competitive search. A mechanism includes an incentive contract if the meeting is bilateral, and an ex post bidding process, in which agents make contract offers, if several agents meet the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951239
We study full surplus extraction and implementation in dynamic environments. We exploit intertemporal correlations of agents' types to construct within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. First, we formulate one-shot environments, in which a single agent has a hidden type and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905050
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013133090
This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a “piecewise affine transformation” of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142214
A risk-neutral principal considers hiring one agent to improve a valuable, observable outcome. Who to hire? How to motivate? In this paper, the principal designs an incentive contract that pays according to the realized outcome and sells the contract to an agent through an auction. The paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014357642
Motivated by challenges facing IT procurement, this paper studies a hybrid procurement model where a reverse auction of a fixed-price IT outsourcing contract may be followed by renegotiation to extend the contract's scope. In this model, the buyer balances the need to incentivize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215390
This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a “piecewise affine transformation” of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003981964
We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the interim distribution of types is common knowledge (the exact number of agents for each type is known), then a mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345986